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Abstract 
Purpose – Although business failure has garnered a plethora of scholarly attention, there 
remains an ambiguity and lack of clarity about the process and types of attribution after a 
business failure. This article examines types of attributions after a business failure.  
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on a synthesis of the multiple streams 
of research on the subject. This led to the development of an integrated framework of 
attributions after business failure.  
Findings – The paper integrates the business failure literature and attribution theory to 
develop a 2x2 conceptual framework which not only accounts for the effect on pace (time), 
but also locus of causality in the attribution process. Crossing the two main causes of 
business failure with two types of attribution produces the 2x2 matrix of types of attribution 
after a business failure which includes: early internal attribution, late internal attribution, 
early external attribution and late external attribution.   
Research limitation/implications – Our theorisation of the literature offers a number of 
implications for theory and practice.  
Originality/value – The study also explains the underlying processes inherent in learning 
from others’ failures and consequences of business failure. Our framework removes some of 
the ambiguity in the existing literature and outlines a number of fruitful avenues for future 
research. 
Introduction  
Over the past three decades, we have witnessed the dramatic improvements in decision 
support systems and technologies in an array of areas including employee evaluation, 
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production planning and control, and strategic formulation (Shim et al., 2002; Osterwalder et 
al., 2005). It has been argued that they play a pivotal role in enabling organisations to 
minimise errors and achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Afuah, 2004).  
Despite these assertions and considerable technological breakthroughs in decision support 
technologies, half of all decisions made within firms fail to achieve the desired outcome 
(Nutt, 1999) and business failure remains a regular occurrence often traced to decisions made 
within the firm (Dovey and Fenech, 2007). Against this backdrop, organisational leaders are 
expected to be judged by the outcomes of their decisions (Lipshitz, 1989), which provides a 
basis for rewards and punishment (Feather and Simon, 1973).  
Broadly speaking, people have a natural tendency to search for meaning and explanations as 
to how and why things occur, to provide a basis for such attribution. Individuals who are able 
to achieve considerable successes through their decisions within an organisation are often 
rewarded with promotion and a pay rise. However, those whose decisions lead to business 
failure are also expected to be subjected to attribution by social arbiters. Despite decades of 
scholarly accomplishment on organisational failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004), some 
scholars (e.g., Yang and Aldrich, 2012) have indicated that our understanding of the 
relationship between business failure and attribution remains limited.  
In addition, although attributions after business failure may be rendered at a different pace, 
scholars have often put together all attributions, ignoring the issue of pace (speed) in the 
attribution process. Indeed, “common observations tell us that our explanations of events 
change over time” and our attributions for individuals’ actions are often modified with the 
passage of time (Burger, 1985:  330). Furthermore, no robust comprehensive framework has 
been developed to distinguish types of attribution after a business failure.  
 4 
The primary purpose of this paper is to develop an integrated framework of types of 
attributions after a business failure to help explain how attributions are rendered. We depart 
from much of the existing literature by developing a unified model of the subject. 
Specifically, we differentiate types of attributions and delineate the underlying processes and 
mechanisms through which they are rendered. In so doing, our study integrates business 
failure literature and attribution theory (Jones and Davis, 1965) to develop a 2x2 framework 
to delineate two types of attribution: immediately or delayed attribution, and two locus of 
causality: controllable and uncontrollable. Such typologies can significantly enrich our 
understanding of the subject (Doty and Glick, 1994).  
Our work further contributes to the literature by clarifying the conditions and the underlying 
processes in post-exit attribution. Our article proceeds by first defining business failure, 
attribution and the role of social arbiters in rendering attribution. This is then followed by the 
development of an integrated framework for studying types of attributions and their effects 
on individuals. By working through the framework, we clarify the components and 
dimensions of attribution. The final section outlines implications for theory and practice.  
Toward a typology of attribution after business failure paradigms  
By business failure, we are referring to situations where the inability of the firm to meet 
stakeholders’ expectations and obligations forces it to cease operations (Amankwah-Amoah, 
2014a; Hamilton, 2006). Although some scholars have argued that business failure is bad (see 
Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004), others have suggested that business failure is good for some 
stakeholders such as competitors, the communities and the wider economy by removing 
inefficient firms and thereby allowing effective competition to thrive (Knott and Posen, 
2005). Some scholars have indicated that: “some individuals respond to failure negatively, 
with feelings of dejection and loss of motivation, whereas others respond more positively, 
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with heightened motivation to succeed” (Johnson et al., 1997: 385). In entrepreneurial 
ventures, recent studies provide evidence that some venture capitalists view past venture 
failure as a sign that the individual is willing to take risks and are willing to invest in their 
venture (McGrath, 2011).  
To ground our model on a firmer theoretical footing, we draw on business failure literature 
(Whetten, 1987) and attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) to develop an integrative framework of 
attribution after business failure. We borrow the two main schools of thought on the causes of 
business failure: voluntaristic and deterministic views (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah 2010; 
Whetten, 1987). The deterministic view contends that business failure is attributed to external 
factors such as economic recession, declining demand, bad luck and market forces which are 
beyond the control of decision makers rather than as an outcome of poor decision-making 
process, laziness, and lack of skills or ability. Failure may also stem from the process of 
natural selection or serendipity, which drives out inefficient firms (Andrews et al., 2006; 
Svensson and Wood, 2005) or natural disasters which stem from indiscriminate “Acts of 
God” over which managers have little or no control (Fothergill, 2003).  Nutt (2004a: 261) 
puts it this way:  
“Good decision-making practices cannot guarantee good outcomes, because of chance 
events. Bad luck, when product demand falls below expectations because of unexpected bad 
weather and the like, can be mistaken for bad decision-making practices. Good luck, such as 
windfall profits due to favourable turn on interest rates or consumer interest in a product, can 
cover up failure-prone decision-making practices.”  
The voluntaristic perspective argues that business failures are simply the result of managers 
and their colleagues’ actions and inactions. This view attributes failure to factors such as the 
inability to anticipate and respond to market changes, lack of effort and ability on the part of 
management and their subordinates (Nutt, 2002). This school of thought further contends that 
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even natural disasters as a cause of failure can be attributed to managers’ failure to anticipate 
and respond to risk in their environment, failure to take precautionary measures such as 
insurance or the decision to locate in high-risk areas (Fothergill, 2003). According to Nutt 
(2004b: 13),  
“Failure almost always stems from decision-maker actions and not from bad luck or 
situational limitations.” In other words, business failure is a result of a number of 
controllable factors.  
We employ these simplistic views of how business failure occurs in deducing our model. To 
build our matrix of attribution, we also borrow the notion of stigma to enrich our analysis. 
Stigma can be defined as the “attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is 
devalued in a particular context” (Crocker et al., 1998: 505; see also McKinley et al., 1996). 
We contend that in instances where the cause of business failure is attributed to internal 
organisational factors such as the inability to identify and respond to changing market 
conditions, risky investment and overpaying for acquisitions bringing about exit, it is likely to 
lead to stigma, where the attribution can be too powerful for the individual to hide from 
others.  
Failure can sometimes be attributed to external factors such as recession and environmental 
disasters, for example fire, flood and heavy rainfall, which destroy all of the assets of the 
business forcing it to cease operation. Under these circumstances, the organisation’s 
managers can claim “no fault” dissolution leading to minimal or no attribution of blame.  
Indeed, organisations should not be seeking to sanction individuals for past actions or 
decision making over which they had little or no control (Arvey and Jones, 1985). Figure 1 
articulates our argument about the causes of business failure and failure as a continuum 
incorporating internal and external causes with varying consequences.   
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------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Attribution theory and society’s arbiters 
We now turn to attribution theory because it provides a unique opportunity to enrich our 
understanding of how observers attach meanings to events. As Kelley (1973: 107) contends, 
the theory is “about how people make causal explanations, about how they answer questions 
beginning with 'why?'.” The theory has been found to be particularly useful for examining 
events or issues that span over a long period of time (Burger, 1985). There are a number of 
schools of thought on the processes underlying attribution.  
Broadly speaking, attribution by social arbiters or observers begins by identifying the key 
individuals and locus of causality, sense-making, and rendering sanctions (Wiesenfeld et al., 
2008; see also Weick, 1995). Recent evidence pinpoints that the basis for attribution 
commences by seeking meanings and explanations for the business failure and factors that 
precipitated it (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Attribution after business failure can be seen as an 
iterative process which involves seeking the locus of causality and delivering attribution (see 
Figure 2).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Organisational failure triggers a range of issues to which arbiters attribute blame or rewards 
where necessary. We employ an evaluating audience or arbiters to refer to the three society 
arbiters (i.e. social, legal and economic) identified by Wiesenfeld et al. (2008). Social arbiters 
refer to stakeholders who possess legitimate platforms to provide an assessment of 
individuals’ actions (Amankwah-Amoah, 2013). Legal arbiters refer to regulatory agencies 
and prosecutors whose responsibility it is to enforce the “rules of the game” and bring to 
book individuals who seem to have committed infringements (see Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). 
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Economic arbiters encompasses executives and directors at other organisations who play a 
key role in deciding to engage with individuals from departed firms such as offering them a 
job. Different arbiters such as regulators and investors can see an individual’s involvement in 
business failure in completely different ways.  
People have a general tendency to attribute success to their efforts and failure to outside 
forces beyond their control. According to the “egocentric bias” perspective (Ross and Sicoly, 
1979), individuals have a greater tendency to give themselves credit for good organisational 
performance and remember more of their contributions relative to their colleagues.  
However, individuals are less likely to either admit their involvement or contributions in 
driving an organisation into the ground. When an organisation ceases to exist, some former 
managers are more likely to engage in actions that allow them to take credit for the successful 
phase in the firm’s life, whilst they attribute the declining period to colleagues or external 
factors (Zuckerman, 1979). This “self-serving attribution bias” means that when failure 
happens it is up to the social arbiters as regulators, expert groups and government agencies to 
identify the locus of causality and then impose sanctions, blame and then punishment on 
managers involved with the failure (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Managers involved in failure 
are more likely to exaggerate their involvement in successful periods in organisational life 
and attribute less successful periods to co-workers. The observers or arbiters are required to 
identify key individuals seen to have committed a deviant act in bringing about the failure.  
Types of attribution 
Once business failure has occurred, we identify two main types of attribution and their 
occurrence: immediate and delayed attribution. Immediate attribution occurs instantaneously 
after business failure often before regulatory or professional bodies have thoroughly 
 9 
examined the issue. This is largely because the individuals are often the first to be identified 
and they are often stigmatised because they might be in the public eye or have a prominent 
position of representing the company to the mass media. Immediately after business failure, 
there are executives who are automatically shamed in the media even before their culpability 
is established, however, there are also those who slip under the radar and never have their 
actions brought under the microscope.  
One of the advantages inherent in early attribution of the individual is that it provides an early 
opportunity to engage in actions aimed at repairing trust and tarnished reputations. In so 
doing, such individuals can re-establish relationships with key stakeholders who have been 
lost due to their involvement in the failure. One of the effects of immediate attribution is that 
sometimes the wrong people have their reputation tarnished for events or decisions which 
were beyond their control or in which they had no involvement and the stigma can last 
wrongly forever.  
Delayed attribution occurs when all of the factors precipitating the business failure are 
known. It is less likely to be potent given that memory may have faded and the emotional 
sentiments associated with the failure have taken a back seat. It may stay in the pipeline for 
months or even years after the event when the individual has “moved on” or even changed 
profession before being sanctioned by arbiters. With delayed attribution, individuals 
connected to business failure are less likely to be sanctioned. This can be attributed to the 
passage of time between the event and the attribution which also leads to the fading of 
memory and often the involvement of the legal profession to mitigate the damage.  
“By the time of the delayed attribution, the salience of the general impression may have faded 
considerably, but some recall of the subjects' own specific actions, and not those of the 
 10 
partner, remained” (Burger and Rodman, 1983: 1238). Some individuals welcome early 
attributions, others try to delay their attribution, whilst others do their very best to avoid 
attribution altogether. The delayed attributions may stem from a lack of information about an 
individual’s involvement earlier during the immediate attribution phase or the sudden 
emergence of new documents outlining that person’s direct involvement in directing and 
managing the failed venture.  
Unlike immediate attributions which happen just after the event, those seen to have 
committed a deviant act or made the wrong decisions have little time or space to detach 
themselves from the guilt or shame following the business failure. Perhaps in some cases, 
delaying attribution may not be as harmful to an individual as early attribution and social 
consequences to help bring about closure. Under certain circumstances, the stigmatisation 
might not be as severe as the individual expects or imagines. Since not all “attribution of 
responsibility and allocation of rewards and punishments are made after the fact” (Lipshitz, 
1989: 381), individuals who are able to delay investigation into their conduct or past 
decisions can get space to devise a strategy to deal with the consequences. Table 1 
summarises the key features of the two types of attribution. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Social arbiters such as professional bodies and regulators who place a high value on fairness 
are more likely to deliver harsh attributions after business failure whether delivered 
immediately or delayed. There is a sense in these bodies to ensure that all individuals are 
treated in the same way since those who receive delayed attribution have had the time to 
assemble resources and develop new expertise which enable them to mount a defence or 
move on from the event. “To avoid being cast in the role of a buffoon, protagonists in public 
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dramas use a number of devices for forestalling such criticism, including justifications, 
rationalisations, and reinterpretations of the events” (Davies, 1987: 51).  
To simplify the discussion, we build on these views to develop a four-cell typology of the 
paradigms of attribution after business failure. Crossing the two main causes of 
organisational failure with two types of attribution, produces the 2x2 matrix of the types of 
attribution after a business failure (see Figure 3). The four combinations of nature of 
attribution (early or delayed) and locus of causality (controllable or uncontrollable factors) 
are represented by a 2x2 matrix. Figure 3 presents our matrix which delineates key features of 
attribution and the process model of the mechanism through which attribution is signalled by 
social arbiters.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Who are the recipients of attribution? 
Past studies indicate that social arbiters through the labour market reward or penalise 
executives and managers for their decisions which bring about business failure or success 
(Fama, 1980). Broadly speaking, all members of a departed organisation are subjected to 
attribution, however, the labour market is unlikely to tar “all managers with the same brush 
based on mere association with a failed firm” (Cannella et al., 1995: 209). One plausible 
reason for not indiscriminately penalising managers of failed firms is the different 
responsibility and degree of controls of each one. Observers are also unlikely to treat all 
organisational members and leaders as equally influential and skilled, or have the same level 
of expectations and control, therefore, there is a need to recognise, distinguish and reclassify 
managerial and non-managerial staff based on their level of responsibility and control in the 
attribution process (See Figure 4).  
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By top-tier managers/executives we are referring to corporate-level decision-makers such as 
the President, Chief Executive Officer, Board of Directors and corporate staff who are 
regarded as the linchpins in the strategic formulation and decision-making process. Such an 
elite and prestigious group are seen to be “competent, credible and trustworthy” and have a 
degree of higher control and responsibility (D’Aveni, 1990; Pozner, 2008). In cases where, 
top-tier managers are perceived to be highly skilled and more knowledgeable about their 
organisation and strategies required to deliver success (D'Aveni, 1989b), failure is more 
likely to lead to severely stigmatised reputations and status within their industry (Sutton and 
Callahan, 1987). Indeed, top-tier managers of failed firms are more likely to attain fewer 
successive jobs in the same industry than their subordinates, largely attributed to their role 
and the greater responsibility attached to their position (Cannella et al., 1995). 
Individuals seen to have committed a deviant act or been culpable for bringing about failure 
are more likely to suffer from diminished human capital in future employment opportunities 
(D’Aveni, 1990; Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills 
and abilities possessed by individuals (Becker, 1964).  Managers of failed firms are more 
likely to find a similar job position if social arbiters attribute the cause to external factors 
which are beyond their control and thereby suffer minimal decline in their human capital 
value (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Top-tier managers with high degree of control have an 
important role in ensuring their firms’ survival by not engaging in extremely risky ventures. 
Second-tier managers refer to functional or divisional heads that often support and help to 
ensure implementation of decisions made by the upper echelon managers/ managers. 
Cannella et al.’s (1995) findings indicate that second-tier managers often play a minimal role 
in their organisation and are unlikely to face severe sanctions relative to top-tier managers 
and may be more likely to secure comparable jobs in the future after their firm’s demise. 
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These scholars also observed that managers of failed firms often secure fewer jobs in the 
same industry after business failure than managers from (non-failed) firms. The third-tier 
managers refer to functional low-level managers below second-tier managers who also play a 
role in strategic implementation.  We also contend that third-tier managers can be seen as 
less-powerful and less-prestigious members of the organisation who are unlikely to be 
sanctioned by legal arbiters such as regulators often due to their minimal role and control of 
their organisation.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
With regard to non-managerial staff, some scholars have observed that “lower-level members 
may perceive that it is not in their interest to convey information that suggests the existence 
of potential performance problems to their bosses” (Fang et al., 2014: 1187). Such 
concealment is likely to affect top-tier managers’ ability to identify root causes of 
organisational problems and deliver effective responses to avoid collapse. Such individuals 
operating in hierarchical organisational structures have a tendency to report positive feedback 
accurately whilst “sugarcoating”, distorting or deleting negative feedback (Fang et al., 2014; 
Morrison and Milliken, 2000). Such information distortions not only stifle interpretation of 
the data but also affect the manager’s response during decline (For a detailed review of 
organisational decline see Mone et al., 1998).  
Although such low-ranking employees have a low level of control and decision-making 
powers, they can affect how performance information is relayed through the organisational 
channels and the interpretation of the information. Such upward communication has the 
potential to enrich the internal workings of the firm and “employees can help stem illegal and 
immoral behaviour, address mistreatment or injustice, and bring problems and opportunities 
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for improvement to the attention of those who can authorize action” (Detert and Edmondson, 
2011: 461). However, individuals seen to have “sugarcoated” information are unlikely to 
avoid attribution. Therefore:  
Proposition 1: Non-managerial employees seen to have sugar-coated or be 
disinclined to disseminate negative information upwards in the organisation before 
business failure are more likely to receive harsher attribution. 
Individuals in declining firms may engage in responses such as doing nothing, opting for 
flight, staying the course and generating a turnaround. The “downward spiral” perspective of 
organisational failure posits that once an organisation enters a period of decline, there is a 
tendency for further incapacitating events to transpire such as the departure of top-tier 
managers, customers’ dissatisfaction, defection of allies and shrinking of the resource base 
with which to innovate (D’Aveni, 1989a, 1990; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988, 1992; 
Semadeni et al., 2008). These events within the organisational life become so incapacitating 
that it forces it to cease operation. 
When a firm enters a downward spiral, executives with a degree of foresight can anticipate 
the potential stigma at the end of the tunnel and may therefore opt for flight before the 
organisation is forced into bankruptcy or exit (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Such executives 
have access to inside information and can therefore anticipate, respond to and minimise 
potentially stigmatising events (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Indeed, some studies have 
indicated that top-tier managers who “jump ship” two years prior to the failure are less likely 
to be stigmatised than those colleagues who remain with the declining firm (e.g. Semadeni et 
al., 2008).  
A case in point is Jeff Skilling of Enron, who departed the company just before the firm 
collapsed.  Such actions often lead to that deterioration of expertise and top talent, and also 
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limit the firm’s ability to attract new executive talent which accelerates the decline and brings 
about the death of the organisation (D’Aveni, 1989a, 1990). Therefore, early attribution 
might not be able to capture the intricacies of ‘jumping ship’ to avoid the stigma which 
significantly affects who should be blamed for business failure. This is important because 
studies have demonstrated that observers sometimes err in rendering attribution either 
through incomplete information, faulty mechanisms in processing information about the role 
of others or new information coming to light (see Tetlock, 1985).  
In the same way, the protracted delays before bankruptcy provide the space for some 
executives to opt for flight to avoid being stigmatised. Therefore, the attribution process of 
some individuals might be before the collapse and individuals with rich inside information 
about the nature of poor decisions and the potential impact on their reputations may opt to 
flee to deflect blame onto others. Prestigious top managers through elite affiliations are able 
to acquire and nurture legitimacy with respect to external agencies such as investors and 
shareholders, which are often lost when they depart declining organisations leading to failure 
(D’Aveni, 1990). By opting to quit before exit, this group of people is able to engage in 
preferential detachment actions to avoid or minimise any stigma stemming from the collapse. 
Also, elite managers may have elite political and social connections as well as financial 
resources which can be utilised to minimise the effects or avoid attribution all together 
(Wahrman, 1972). The elites have long been seem to be highly educated and are often 
connected to individuals who fill most positions of power and authority in the wider society 
(Clignet & Foster, 1964). The social network in tandem with the considerable financial 
resources can be deployed to mount a successful public defence of their reputation and 
actions through explaining issues seen to have been “misrepresented”.  
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A similar line of thinking suggests that the pace at which bankruptcy happens has the 
potential to shape the post-exit attribution. During the process of decline, not all prestigious 
managers may ‘jump ship’ to avoid stigma, but for some their pay package may become 
totally unaffordable to a financially troubled firm, leading to their exit (D'Aveni, 1989b). 
Their exit sometimes accelerates the process of failure because it often conveys signals to 
stakeholders that “a financially troubled organisation is no longer worthy of their support” 
and that there will be a further decline in the firm’s human capital base (D’Aveni, 1990: 138). 
Based on the above discussion, we propose the following:  
Proposition 2: Top-tier managers who jump ship before the business collapse, are 
more likely to avoid early attribution but are unlikely to escape delayed attribution 
(“Jeff Skilling effects”). 
The typology of attribution after business failure 
Having set out the recipients of attribution and the attribution process, we now turn our 
attention to the 2x2 matrix articulated at the outset of this article and its distinctive features.   
Cell I: Early internal attribution  
Cell I represents a situation where the observers deliver an attribution immediately after the 
event, however, the failure is attributed to mainly firm-specific factors such as poor 
leadership, loss of key personnel, and inability to identify and address the early signals of 
decline. Delivering such rapid attribution is essential in an environment, where observers are 
under intense pressure for rapid decisions by making use of the available information (Dutton 
et al., 1997). There is little time for the individual to assemble evidence and resources to 
mount any robust defence to deflect the blame from his or her actions. More importantly, the 
fresh emotion associated with the business failure means that often those in the spotlight are 
sanctioned, i.e. first- and second-tier managers.  
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However, this rush to judgement may create conditions where individuals are immediately 
stigmatised or shamed for the actions and decisions of others within the departed 
organisation. This often happens because of the demands of the public for immediate 
punishment of those seen to have made the wrong decisions. Stigmatisation occurs when a 
person possesses “some attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is 
devalued in a particular social context” (Crocker et al., 1998: 505). Shame refers to the 
“public disapproval of some impropriety or personal shortcoming” (Tangney 1990: 102).   
To illustrate this argument, we turn to the case of Spanair. The airline was founded in 1986 as 
a charter airline by Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). At the outset, the firm was seen as 
one of the promising companies in the European airline industry. By the early 1990s, it had 
expanded to countries such as the United States and Mexico, however, its operations had 
remained largely unprofitable (Minder & Clark, 2012). In 2009, SAS sold its 80.1% stake to 
Catalan investors for a mere €1. The sale value exemplified the precarious financial position 
of the firm at the time.  
After the sale, the prominent top executives recruited were confident that they could turn the 
fortune of the airline around. Over time, the constant media reports of its weak position 
meant that observers became more informed of the internal problems of the business. Indeed, 
the firm reported an operating loss of €115m (£96m) in 2010 and warned investors of 
potential future losses (The Guardian, 2012). In 2012, Spanair collapsed after a period of 
poor performances. The collapse led to the uncertain status of around 2,000 employees, 
cancellations of around 220 flights and 23,000 stranded passengers (Minder & Clark, 2012).  
The collapse immediately led to public condemnation and shame of top executives including 
the Chief Executive Officer- Mike Szücs, the Vice-President- Miquel Martí and Chairman- 
 18 
Ferran Soriano (Flottau, 2012; The 02b, 2012). They were also immediately condemned by 
the Spanish government and Ministry of Public Works. Their reputations were severely 
tarnished and competences seriously questioned given that they had closed the business and 
cancelled all flights at a mere half an hour's notice (Gulfnews, 2012; The 02b, 2012). The 
attribution was more potent given the thousands of angry and stranded passengers of the 
airline around the world. 
In addition, the top executives were also found to have pursued a reckless strategy which had 
endangered the airline. Indeed, prior to its demise, the firm “became notorious among its 
competitors for offering aggressively low fares, far below what could reasonably be the 
airline's own break-even threshold” (Flottau, 2012: 24). This helped to protect its key market 
and slowed down rivals’ encroachment, but it was an unsustainable strategy for the business. 
In a nutshell, the top executives came to be stigmatised by the so-called “the ghost of 
Spanair”, i.e., poor leadership and managerial issues (The 02b, 2012). 
Cell II: Late internal attribution   
This is where observers conclude that the locus of causality is internal but render late 
attribution. This often stems from a long drawn-out process of investigation and the need to 
identify all of the culprits rather than those immediately visible to the public eye. In this cell, 
the seriousness of the case and the wider impact force observers to engage in such 
investigation. The ability to allow things to settle down before an attribution is made, helps to 
take strong emotions out of the process and provides a basis for a better decision. Negative 
internal late attribution is more likely to lead to a decline in former employees’ human capital 
and undermine any claim of competence.  
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However, individuals receiving verification from social arbiters of having acted correctly or 
as being completely exonerated of precipitating business failure are more likely to see their 
human capital value enhanced in the current and future job market (see Deci and Ryan, 
1985). However, such late attribution enables individuals to accumulate new resources and 
capability that then provide a basis for self-defence and demonstrate that lessons have been 
learnt.  
To illustrate this point about the long drawn out attribution process and the effects on the 
individual, we turn to the UK financial industry and the case of the British arm of the 
collapsed Icelandic bank Kaupthing. Following the bank’s demise, the UK Financial Services 
Authority concluded after a protracted investigation that the behaviour of three former 
directors of the bank, Armann Thorvaldsson, Sigurdur Einarsson and Hreidar Mar 
Sigurdsson, was unprofessional and that they failed to act with due skill, care and diligence, 
and were banned from holding senior roles within the authorised British banking industry for 
five years (Treanor, 2012).  
The authority ascertained that they adopted a growth strategy and made decisions but failed 
to anticipate and deal with the risks associated with them. Some argued that the punishment 
in the case did not fit the offence (see Treanor, 2012). There are inherent difficulties in 
deciding the right level of sanction as some individuals can be severely punished whilst 
others escape with minimal damage to their reputation. The above illustrative case paints a 
less than flattering description about the tendency of observers to over-attribute or under-
attribute in many instances.  
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Cell III: Early external attribution   
This is where the individual receives an early attribution but the failure is due to external 
factors over which he/she had limited control. Under these circumstances, the attribution is 
less likely to be severe. Despite the early nature of the attribution, the individual recipient has 
a better chance of diminishing or avoiding any stigmatisation from the event. Although 
people often attempt to conceal their stigma by suppressing thoughts about it (Smart and 
Wegner, 1999), there is greater likelihood that individuals with a tendency to withhold such 
information are more likely to be severely sanctioned when new information emerges 
uncovering their stigma. However, when similar events occur in the future, observers’ 
attention will be drawn to past events which are often moulded into the collective 
consciousness of interested parties and those who seek further accountability even in the 
future.  
To illustrate this argument, we turn to the case of Q-cells. The firm was a German-based 
company with production facilities in countries such as Malaysia and Sweden. After its 
formation, it gained a reputation as one of the leading solar photovoltaic (PV) manufacturers. 
Indeed, it was regarded as “the energy company of the future” and ranked as the world's 
biggest maker of solar panels in 2008 with an estimated value of €8 billion (Schultz, 2012). 
By 2010, its position at the top of solar PV cell manufacturers in the world had slipped 
(REN21, 2011). In April 2012, the firm announced bankruptcy proceedings. Following the 
Euro crisis and global economic crisis of 2008, governments in Europe and elsewhere sought 
to reduce government spending which affected the solar industry.  
In 2012, the German government decided to reduce the subsidies for solar power production 
by up to 30% (Wiesmann, 2012). The decision to reduce the fixed price shrunk the revenue 
stream of the firm and weakened its financial position. By late 2012, the bankrupted Q-Cells’ 
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assets were sold to South Korea's Hanwha. The reduction in subsidies alongside the 
increasing global competition and economic crisis sealed the fate of Q-cells. Perhaps more 
importantly, the demise of rival businesses such as Solar Millenium, Odersun and 
Solarhybrid within months of each other persuaded observers that failure was largely due to 
factors beyond the control of the top management team (Wiesmann, 2012; Schultz, 2012).  
Cell IV: Late external attribution  
Cell IV is where the causes of failure are attributed to external factors such as global 
competition, luck and natural disasters, but where attribution is delayed. The delay might be 
due to the observers’ decisions to seek better sources of information on the individuals and 
the decision-making processes in the departed firm. There are cases where the timing of the 
business failure becomes very important in the attribution process. For instance, when the 
firm ceases to exist during times of economic crisis and political instability, this is more 
likely to be viewed as  a “no-fault dissolution”, where managers linked to the failure are less 
likely to be stigmatised (Forsman, 2001).  
With such delayed attribution, the heat may have gone out of the issues, thereby providing 
the time and space to respond to and overcome any stigma or shame. Delayed attribution may 
come so late that it can be rendered toothless and the imprint of the events in the 
consciousness of society may have faded away. Attribution rendered late after the event can 
be advantageous to the individual. This is partly because during the intervening period some 
individuals can acquire new expertise, new resources and networks of ties which enable them 
to mount a robust defence of their actions or claim that lessons have already been learnt. 
Individuals may have developed inbuilt capacity to handle public scrutiny and assemble 
resources necessary to repair his or her reputation. In addition, protracted investigations often 
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enable individuals to escape punishment or dodge any public scrutiny, or could simply not be 
traced by social arbiters (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  
To illustrate this cell further, we turn to the case of Solyndra. The firm was once regarded as 
an exemplary business model of public-private partnership to help promote and develop 
expertise in the solar PV industry (Johnson & Suskewicz, 2009). The firm then received US 
government-backed loan guarantees of around $535 million in 2009. In addition to this, it 
also received the support of the US Department of Energy to open factories to manufacture 
solar panels.  
The collapse in 2011 triggered a protracted Congressional investigation which meant that 
attribution was rendered late. Since it’s collapsed, the name Solyndra has become 
synonymous with government’s incompetence and ineffectiveness in picking “winners” and 
“losers” in the marketplace (Lesser, 2011). It has also become the symbol ingrained in the 
American political discourse that “federally subsidized solar-panel” manufacturers are 
unlikely to succeed in a competitive environment (Himmelman, 2012).  
The demise was subsequently accompanied by political humiliation of politicians including 
the Vice-President Joe Biden who once stood at the company premises and declared “The 
future is here” (Scherer, 2011: 34–37). After the initial euphoria, more information emerged 
to shed light on the role of managers (see Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2012). With 
the passage of time, the public memory of the event had faded away after the investigations.  
Moderating influences  
There are a number of moderating factors which need to be taken into consideration in our 
quest to deepen our understanding of the subject. Although some scholars have suggested that 
attribution after business failure is based mainly on careful evaluation of actions and 
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inactions of key players (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008), we contend that hindsight plays an 
influential role in this process. Given that people have a tendency to view decisions that 
generate good results in a positive light, observers are likely to view decisions leading to 
business failure in a negative light. Indeed, it has been suggested that with hindsight, people 
not only exaggerate what things were foreseeable, but also overestimate the predictability of 
the event if it had led to a negative outcome such as failure (Davies, 1987; Lipshitz, 1989). 
Davies (1987: 50) further argued that “not only do hindsightful judges overestimate how 
much other people knew (or should have known) before the event, they even misremember 
their own foresight state of ignorance, recalling that they were wiser before the event than 
was actually the case”.  
In rendering attribution, “decision making processes are perceived as more satisfactory when 
they lead to success, and successful decision makers are perceived more favourably than their 
unsuccessful counterparts” (Lipshitz, 1989: 380). This is important because scholars have 
long established that, even when instructed not to do so, observers have a tendency to take 
into consideration outcomes when evaluating one’s actions and decisions (Fincham, 1985).  
Another moderating influence is that some attributions are based on incomplete information, 
especially in the case of early attributions. Because of the inherent difficulties in identifying 
the causes of failure, it is often very difficult for observers to be certain, which often leads to 
errors such as attributing blame to innocent bystanders or parties (Cannella et al., 1995). In a 
way, delayed attribution may not be good for the public who demand immediate punishment, 
but it helps to thwart irrelevant information from impeding the attribution process.  
In addition, there is a tendency for people involved in failure to engage in impression 
management to help minimise any stigmatisation of their identity or reputation. Impression 
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management refers to the “psychological process by which people attempt to create and 
maintain desired perceptions of themselves in the eyes of others” (Dutton et al., 1997: 409). It 
is worth noting that people have a tendency to defend themselves by arguing that social 
arbiters have a “lack of perspicacity” and ignore key events surrounding the decision that 
forced managers to engage in a particular course of action (Davies, 1987).  
However, this often depends on the resources accumulated by the individual to mount a 
defence or change others’ perceptions of them. We contend that “idiosyncratic credits” 
(Hollander, 1958) such as networks of relationships developed by the individual, are more 
likely to moderate the effects of attribution. ‘Idiosyncrasy credit’ refers to a situation in 
which the observers’ interpretations, sensemaking and attribution of business failure is 
moderated by an individual or organisation’s past behaviour or actions (Hollander, 1958; 
Amankwah-Amoah, 2013). 
Furthermore, dissociative steps such as preferential detachment from groups or colleagues 
can be an effective mechanism through which individuals can protect their colleagues as well 
as minimise the effects of stigma on others. With preferential detachment, we are referring to 
actions taken by individuals to minimise the effects of stigma or reduce risk to others 
unconnected to the business failure (Yu et al., 2008). Those who can demonstrate features 
that de-link them from the stigmatised others are more likely to minimise or alleviate the 
effects to preserve their reputation. Delinking activities can come from the stigmatised others 
who would mount a public defence of those connected to them. Based on the above 
arguments, we propose the following: 
Proposition 3: On balance, former executives who take steps to assemble key 
resources as well as mount a public defence are more likely to moderate the effect of 
any sanction. 
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Discussion and conclusion  
The primary purpose was to delineate the types of attributions after business failure and the 
underlying processes through which such attributions are rendered. The study tapped into the 
existing streams of research on attributions and business failure to develop a 2x2 matrix, 
which incorporates timing of attribution alongside the locus of causality. Crossing the two 
main causes of organisational failure (i.e., internal and external factors) with two types of 
attribution (i.e., immediate attribution and delayed attribution) produced the 2x2 matrix 
which entails:  early internal attribution, late internal attribution, early external attribution and 
late external attribution. The conceptual strength of the matrix lies in enriching our 
understanding of the effects of pace in the attribution process. 
Our analysis also suggests that either early or delayed attribution has varying effects on 
former first-tier, second-tier and third-tier managers, and other non-managerial employees of 
the departed firm. This is largely due to their degree of control, influences and expectations 
of the departed firm. Through their elite networks and resources, first-tier managers are able 
to assemble resources and capabilities to evade and/or mitigate attribution by jumping ship or 
responding better than second- and third-tier managers. 
Our study contributes to attribution and business failure literature in at least two ways. One of 
the shortcomings of the existing theoretical and empirical works on attribution after business 
failure has been the tendency to put all attributions together. Although scholars have 
examined the consequences of business failure (e.g. Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007) and 
attributions (e.g. Burger and Rodman, 1983), these have not been fully integrated to 
distinguish types of attribution in the post-exit environment. By integrating these two streams 
of research, we derive an overarching framework that distinguishes types of attribution and 
 26 
explicates the conditions and processes through which immediate and delayed attributions are 
rendered.  
In addition, our paper contributes to ongoing efforts to develop theory which helps to deliver 
a better explanation of the post-exit effects (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008; Amankwah-Amoah, 
2014b). Thus, we extend Hoetker and Agarwal’s (2007) findings on the post-exit effect by 
conceptualising the literature through the 2x2 framework, which offers clarity and removes 
some of the ambiguity in the existing streams of research on attribution after business failure.  
Practical implications 
The study offers a number of useful insights for practising managers. First, our findings 
suggest that there is a need for greater accountability of social arbiters to help reduce or even 
eliminate errors in both early and delayed attribution. Although recipients of incorrect early 
attribution might be able to repair the damage, “what often results is not the acquisition of 
fully normal status, but a transformation of self from someone with a particular blemish into 
someone with a record of having corrected a particular blemish” (Goffman, 1963: 9). Correct 
attribution is particularly important in ensuring that the wrong people are not punished or 
stigmatised for others’ actions and inactions. This is pertinent given how society deals with 
those who have been seen to have been involved in failure.  
By requiring more observers to justify their decisions in public, they are more likely to invest 
time and pay careful attention to all of the relevant information before reaching a conclusion 
and eliminating errors in the attribution process (Tetlock, 1985). This helps to prevent 
attribution based on incomplete information. Furthermore, there is a need for the right 
balance in ensuring that those responsible for business failure are brought to book for 
illegalities and are punished for poor decision-making, but we must ensure that we do not 
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create conditions that make people afraid or unwilling to take a risk. There is also a need to 
ensure that attributions are not so severe such that they inhibit an individual’s ability to move 
on after the event, however, criminal behaviour should be punished to deter others. 
“Since good processes are more likely (albeit not certain) to yield good outcomes, 
decision makers should not be rewarded for bad decisions that succeed, nor penalized 
for good decisions that fail” (Lipshitz, 1989: 381).  
 
Directions for future research 
The typology has suggested a number of promising avenues for future research on attribution 
after business failure. A great deal remains to be learned about the role of organisational and 
national culture in the attribution process and the extent to which attribution differs across 
cultures. Unlike American society, many countries in the emerging world such as Ghana take 
a different attitude towards failure and often offer little or no opportunity for individuals to 
move on or recover (Amankwah-Amoah, 2013; Sandage, 2005). This area presents a fruitful 
avenue for scholars to enrich our understanding of attribution in general.  
Another promising line of research would be to clarify the mechanisms through which some 
individuals are able to escape even delayed attribution for business failure and potential gains 
in such actions. This would be interesting given that those who are able to dodge attribution 
in the short term may require fewer resources and capabilities to repair their tarnished image. 
A great deal of thought is also required to examine how the attribution by social actors can 
help government craft policies that provide conditions for a “second chance” to flourish.  
Our work also points to the need for future research to test the propositions identified and 
their generalisability across societies. We ought to know more about the reasons why some 
individuals are able to escape the public eye and therefore attribution for their deep 
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involvement in business failure. There is a need to broaden our theoretical quest to 
incorporate the mechanisms through which such individuals can take on new identities in a 
new location.  
One of the limitations of our 2x2 matrix is that it glosses over the complex process and issues 
involved in determining the extent to which internal and external factors interacted to affect 
attributions. There is great potential for exploring the complexities inherent in attributions 
after business failure. We hope that these efforts serve as a catalyst for more research on both 
pre- and post-business failure attributions. 
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Table 1. Type of attributions after business failure  
 Immediate Attribution Delayed  Attribution 
Features 
and 
benefits 
 Locus of causality not yet fully 
explored.  
 Arbiters tend to deliver harsher 
sanctions. 
 Demand greater resources to 
repair tarnished image.  
 Avoid lingering attribution 
process. 
 Full examination of the facts.  
 Ability to assemble expertise and 
resources to mount defence. 
 Opportunity to engage 
impression management and 
preferential detachment. 
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Figure 1: A continuum of attribution after business failure  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: An integrated framework of the attribution process 
 
 
Severity of attribution  
High  Low  
  
Deterministic 
(uncontrollable) 
factors  
Voluntaristic 
(controllable) 
factors 
 
Chain of events from the decline to demise 
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Figure 3: A four-cell typology of attribution after business failure 
                                                          Timing scenarios/pace of attribution   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Locus of 
causality  
        Early attribution             Delayed/late attribution  
 
Voluntaristic 
view (lack of 
ability and 
effort) 
Cell I:  
 Punitive punishment  
 Stigmatised groups and 
individuals 
 Very severely sanctioned  
Cell II 
 Stigmatised groups 
 Moderately sanctioned  
 
 
Deterministic 
view 
(uncontrollable 
factors)  
 
Cell 111 
 Moderately sanctioned  
 Bad luck  
 
Cell 1V 
 Industry-wide responsibility  
 “No fault” dissolution or bad luck 
 
                                                         
High sanction                      Low sanction  
                                                                                                               Key 
                                                                                                                                   Cell interactions in the matrix 
                                                                                                                                   Degree of attribution/sanction 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The influence of control and responsibility and effects on attribution 
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